Sunday, November 4, 2018

Watergate, part 2 (Representational Pictures, History Channel, 2018)

by Mark Gabrish Conlan • Copyright © 2018 by Mark Gabrish Conlan • All rights reserved

Last night I watched the second part of the History Channel’s multi-part documentary Watergate, written and directed by Charles Ferguson and quite a good presentation of a slice of political history I still remember vividly. Watergate (the event, not the movie) so totally rewrote the book both on how political scandals happen and on how the media covers them that for decades later the suffix “-gate” got affixed to virtually every subsequent scandal in politics. The basic facts are that Richard Nixon, beset from his earliest years with an intense degree of status anxiety and a sense that the people really running things — the Ivy League-educated WASP elites and their Jewish paymasters (one thing that comes across from Ferguson’s documentary is the depth of Nixon’s anti-Semitism — even though his Mideast policies favored Israel and Henry Kissinger was his top foreign policy advisor, for the most part he hated Jews with a passion and bought into a lot of the nasty anti-Semitic myths that were current when he was growing up, including the one that they were the secret paymasters behind both capitalism and Communism) — didn’t want him in their club, managed to claw and scratch his way into the White House but didn’t feel comfortable there. Though he at least won a plurality of the popular vote (unlike George W. Bush in 2000 and Donald Trump in 2016), he only got 43 percent and he was determined that when he ran for re-election in 1972 he would not only win but amass such a huge popular vote total and win in such a sweeping landslide there would never again be any question about his legitimacy. (And he didn’t necessarily intend to stop there, either; there are reports that Nixon had people investigating what it would take to repeal the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution — passed, ironically, in 1947 by Republicans who wanted to make sure a future Democrat couldn’t repeat Franklin Roosevelt’s achievement of winning four straight Presidential elections — so he could run again and again in perpetuity.)

Some of the things Nixon did to ensure his massive landslide victories were good things, like the diplomatic opening to China (San Francisco Chronicle satire columnist Art Hoppe did a great spoof in which Nixon announced to his wife Pat, “Guess what? I’ve found China!” “Where was it, dear?” she asked, and he said, “Right where Harry Truman and Dean Acheson lost it” — a reference to decades of Republican propaganda that blamed Democrats in general, and President Truman and his secretary of state, Dean Acheson, in particular for having “lost China” when the Communist revolutionaries took over in 1949) and the détente with the Soviet Union, including starting the series of nuclear arms limitation treaties the current Republican President is trying to break up. (In 1970 Nixon had also signed into law the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act and the bill creating the Environmental Protection Agency — also things the current President is out to destroy.) This episode of Watergate — it’s not altogether clear whether there’s just one more episode in the program (being shown tonight) or two — started where the first one ended, on March 21, 1973, when Nixon’s White House counsel John Dean came into his office and told him Watergate was becoming “a cancer on the Presidency” and that E. Howard Hunt was immediately demanding $120,000 in hush money for his legal fees or he’d blow the whistle on the whole White House cover-up; and the so-called “Saturday Night Massacre” that October, in which Nixon determined to fire Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox; Nixon’s attorney general, Elliot Richardson, resigned rather than do so; Nixon fired the assistant attorney general, William Ruckelshaus (who had previously been the first director of the Environmental Protection Agency — back when there were still Republicans who believed in protecting the environment — and then for three months interim director of the FBI) when he also refused to fire Cox; and Nixon finally turned to Solicitor General Robert Bork, the third in command at the Justice Department, who sacked Cox and issued an order officially abolishing the Office of Special Counsel.

Among the interviewees on this program are Office of Special Counsel veterans Richard Ben-Veniste, George Frampton and Jill Volner (she’s now known as Jill Wine-Banks and as such is a frequent guest on MS-NBC comparing Nixon’s and Trump’s obstructions of justice) — Ben-Veniste and Frampton wrote Stonewall, in my opinion the best single book on Watergate from the point of view of anyone involved in prosecuting it — and they recall that during the run-up to the “Saturday Night Massacre” they and other members of Cox’s staff had started taking files relating to the case out of their offices and hiding them in their homes or the homes of their relatives (Ben-Veniste recalled leaving one of the most sensitive sets of files with his grandmother) to make sure that Nixon and Bork didn’t follow up on their order abolishing the Special Counsel’s office by sealing its work space and denying them access to their own work product. In Stonewall Ben-Veniste and Frampton said they decided that they and the other staff members would continue to work as a prosecution team and await developments — which just weeks later led to the appointment of a replacement special counsel, Leon Jaworski, who remained on the job until the key Nixon staff members who had masterminded the Watergate cover-up were put on trial at the end of 1974. One of the most interesting parts of Ferguson’s treatment of the Watergate story is how he documents, based on White House tapes made between the resignations of H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman on April 30, 1973 and the exposure and dismantling of the White House taping system in mid-July, that the cover-up continued right along after Haldeman’s and Ehrlichman’s departures (indeed, Haldeman secretly entered the White House so Nixon could still confer with him at least once after his official departure) and the so-called “second Watergate cover-up,” led by Nixon in association with General Alexander Haig (Haldeman’s replacement as White House chief of staff) and Henry Kissinger, was never prosecuted (Jaworski having regarded his job as done once four of the five people he put on trial for the first cover-up — Haldeman, Ehrlichman, former attorney general John Mitchell and former deputy attorney general Robert Mardian — were convicted). This episode of Watergate showed clips from the famous hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Campaign Activities — that was its official name, though it was generally referred to as the “Senate Watergate Committee” — and in particular the explosive revelations former White House counsel John Dean came up with after he switched sides and turned state’s evidence in the case. The Watergate Committee’s staff, including majority counsel Sam Dash and minority counsel Fred Thompson, also turned up a witness named Alexander Butterfield, who revealed the existence of the White House recording system by which virtually all the President’s conversations were taped. My understanding based on how it was reported then was that Thompson was conducting a routine private interview with Butterfield in which he asked Butterfield if a particular White House conversation was recorded, and was startled when Butterfield told him they all were.

Presidents since Franklin Roosevelt had been secretly recording some of their White House conversations, ostensibly for historical purposes — though in FDR’s time the available recording technologies would have been disc recorders or grooved Dictaphone belts, not tapes — but all the Presidents from Roosevelt to Johnson had controls on the system so they could push a button to record a particular conversation. Nixon was the first (and, so far, the only — as far as is known, given what happened to Nixon no President since has routinely taped himself and the people he was talking to in the Oval Office or any of the President’s other work spaces) President who essentially, as one commentator at the time put it, bugged himself: he set up the system to record himself automatically, complete with “locator lights” that told the staff running it where he was at any given moment so they could make sure the appropriate recorders were turned on. (One writer at the time compared the “locator lights” to the way the U.S. targeted Viet Namese soldiers for bombing raids in the war.) Of course, once the existence of the tapes was revealed everyone — the special counsel’s office, the Senate committee, the media and the public — wanted to hear them, and Nixon utterly refused. John J. Sirica, who’d been involved as a judge in the Watergate case since he drew the assignment to preside over the trial of the actual burglars, ruled that Nixon could keep the tapes from the Senate committee but he had to turn them over to the special prosecutor. The White House appealed, and the Ninth Circuit federal appeals court in D.C. rejected their appeal. Then, rather than appeal the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, Nixon and his people decided that the way to make the whole pesky problem of the special prosecutor go away was to fire him — only the principled stands of Richardson and Ruckelshaus against doing so highlighted just out of control Nixon was and how determined he was to set himself above the law, and that more than anything else was what turned public opinion so dramatically against Nixon and led to his near-impeachment and resignation from office a bit over a year later. Nixon’s justification for not letting anyone hear the tapes — that the confidentiality of executive communications had to be preserved, not only for him but for future Presidents — might have had some credibility if it hadn’t begged the question, “If you were so concerned about the confidentiality of White House communications, why did you make the tapes in the first place?”

Of course, much of the interest in a program about Watergate today — and no doubt central to the History Channel not only green-lighting the show but telecasting it during the run-up to the November 6 midterm elections — lies in the obvious comparisons and contrasts between Richard Nixon and Donald Trump, both Republicans, both consumed by personal status anxieties, both with an expansive view of Presidential power that regards the President as virtually above the law (after Watergate, Nixon was interviewed by David Frost and in the most chilling remark answered Frost’s question about what would happen if the President ordered someone in the Justice Department to do something illegal, and Nixon matter-of-factly answered, “When the President does it, that means it is not illegal” — and we’ve seen Trump go even farther in his recent statement that he could end “birthright citizenship,” the law that says anyone born on U.S. soil is a U.S. citizen, with an executive order even though that right is established in the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution — even Nixon never said a President could abolish part of the Constitution by executive fiat!), and both highly controversial figures who were accused of rigging their own elections. Nixon was accused of rigging the 1972 election with his own people; Trump is accused of getting help from Russia to rig his election, but in a lot of ways the accusations are similar: both Nixon and Trump are accused of sabotaging American democracy by illegally putting thumbs on the scales of political balance and thereby gaining unfair advantages over their opponents. I’ve already pointed out some of the differences between Nixon and Trump — and between technology as it existed in 1972 and in 2016, particularly the way in which computer technology has made it much easier to get the kinds of information Nixon and his people wanted on potential Democratic opponents and “weaponize” it against them. In 1972, if Nixon’s campaign wanted to eavesdrop on the personal communications of their opponents, they had either to hire “moles” to infiltrate the campaigns, steal written data and copy them (during Ed Muskie’s abortive run for the Democratic nomination in late 1971/early 1972 there was a Nixon staffer in his campaign doing just that!) or break into their offices and plant bugs (as Nixon’s people had done successfully in May 1972 — only the bug they placed on the phone of the chair of the Democratic National Committee didn’t work and the one they placed on the treasurer’s worked but mostly captured him making dates with various women, or trying to — it was to fix the bug on the chair’s phone that they broke in on June 17, 1972 and that time were caught).

Now all they have to do is hack the other campaign’s computer files — or get a volunteer from this country or another one to do it for them — the current special counsel, Robert Mueller, seems to be focused on an alleged pipeline in which Russia hacked the e-mail accounts of Hillary Clinton and her key campaign officials, notably John Podesta, then turned them over to the supposedly independent WikiLeaks organization headed by Julian Assange (a Swedish native who settled in Britain and became a hero to the American and worldwide Left when his group exposed video of U.S. war atrocities in Iraq, then a villain when he decided that between Clinton and Trump, Trump was the lesser of two evils and he was going to do whatever he could to ensure that Trump won), which in turn allegedly coordinated the releases of Clinton’s and Podesta’s e-mails with longtime Trump confidant and dirty-trickster (essentially Trump’s Donald Segretti) Roger Stone so they could be timed with maximum effectiveness to destroy Clinton’s election chances and boost Trump’s. Computers have facilitated political espionage the same way they facilitated identity theft — once upon a time, if you wanted to assume someone else’s identity, you had to forge physical documents saying you were that person; now all you have to do is hack into their online accounts and take them over. The other obvious contrasts between Nixon and Trump are the sheer unscrupulousness and boorishness of Trump compared to Nixon, who for all his own ethical challenges still wanted to appear to the public as a man of moral rectitude: Trump couldn’t care less, and one of the most striking things about the re-creations of the White House conversations of the Nixon years in this show (with a cast of actors playing Nixon and his staff) is how vividly they demonstrate that Trump is willing to say in public things Nixon only dared say in private, including denouncing the media and major celebrities as “enemies.” (One oddly wince-inducing moment is a clip from a TV news broadcast announcing the release of Nixon’s “enemies’ list” in which Bill Cosby is among the names on it. Today, of course, Cosby is notorious for something quite apart from his politics!)

The other big difference between Nixon and Trump — though this is one that America’s voters may be able and willing to change on November 6 — is that Nixon had to face a Congress controlled by the opposition political party, and Trump has not. What’s more, Nixon lived in an era in which there was much less partisanship in Washington, D.C. than there is now; there were three Republicans on the Senate Watergate committee — Howard Baker, Lowell Weicker and Edward Gurney (though in this program Gurney is misidentified as a Democrat) — and of these three only Gurney was a total Republican loyalist. Weicker staked out a position as an independent early on and made it clear he was going to be as tough in his questioning of White House staff people as any of the committee’s Democrats; and Baker, after starting the investigation as Nixon’s point man on the committee (he was secretly leaking documents about where the investigation was going to the White House), stepped back early on as he was personally appalled by what the White House had done and became a tougher, more independent committee member. Today the committees in Congress supposedly “investigating” Trump are controlled not only by Republicans but by Republican toadies as well — there doesn’t seem to be anyone in Congress with the level of independence of Weicker (who ultimately got driven out of the Republican Party and continued his political career as an independent), Baker, Congressmember Tom Railsback (who became the weather vane on the House Judiciary Committee as to whether there would be any Republicans willing to vote to impeach Nixon, and whose other claim to fame was carrying the bill to authorize a government apology and financial compensation for the Japanese-Americans interned during World War II) and Senators Barry Goldwater and Hugh Scott, who met with Nixon after the release of the so-called “smoking gun” tape (from June 23, 1972, just six days after the Watergate break-in, in which Nixon O.K.’d the plan to have CIA director Vernon Walters tell acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray not to investigate Watergate because it was a “national security” issue) and told him he would need to resign or there would be enough Republican votes in the Senate for the two-thirds majority to convict him and remove him from office.

The Republican fealty to Donald Trump — even among people who opposed him originally, and even among people he viciously insulted when they ran against him for the Republican Presidential nomination in 2016 (like Texas Senator Ted Cruz, who’s eagerly accepting Trump’s help in his re-election campaign even though Trump once called him “Lyin’ Ted” and accused Cruz’s father of being part of the conspiracy to assassinate President John F. Kennedy on the basis of a photo in the National Enquirer, supposedly taken in 1963, of two blurry figures in a restaurant together which the Enquirer said were Cruz’s father and Lee Harvey Oswald) — is amazing by comparison and the biggest thing Trump has going for him. Indeed, I am convinced that if the Republicans maintain control of both houses of Congress this year (they are virtually certain to keep and even expand their majority in the Senate and  have a good chance of holding on to the House of Representatives as well), Trump will respond by staging a “Saturday Night massacre” of his own, firing attorney general Jeff Sessions and deputy attorney general Rod Rosenstein and installing a new attorney general who will in turn fire special counsel Mueller and make the entire Trump-Russia investigation go away — and Republicans throughout the country will applaud the move while Democrats will stew helplessly in their own juices.